Illocution in Functional Discourse Grammar

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Abstract

Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG) has its own way in dealing with illocutions. Illocutions in FDG are divided into abstract illocutions and performative verbs. This paper sheds light on the way FDG deals with illocution according to its current frame showing its inability to deal with implicit illocutions. The study suggests a new view depending on context and concept to deal with such illocutions. A new frame is proposed with analyses of different examples to test its applicability as a step towards the development of the theory.

Introduction

Functional Discourse grammar (Hengeveld 2004a, 2004b, 2005) (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2006, 2008), (Mackenzie & Gomez-Gonzalez 2004, 2005) , (Groot & Hengeveld 2005), (Garcia Velasco & Rijkhoff 2008) is the latest manifestation of Simon Dik's Functional Grammar, and it appears as a response to criticism of the earlier model, particularly in reaction to the small part played by discourse phenomena, and also the low priority accorded, in practice if not in principle, to cognitive (psychological) and pragmatic adequacy.

Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008: 9 – 10) say that FDG is so called because it seeks to understand the structure of utterances in their discourse context, though it is in no sense a discourse analytical model. The intention developed by the speaker does not arise in vacuum, but in a multifaceted communicative context. It is as shown in Figure 1 the grammatical component of a more comprehensive model: there is a conceptual component in which conceptualization and communicative intentions are developed, and which drives the grammar; an output component dealing with the ultimate representation of language production as sounds, written marks or signing, and a contextual component which contains a record of the content and form of the preceding discourse, and also information about the setting in which the speech event occurs.

The central unit of analysis in FDG is the Move (M) which is the grammatical realization of communicative intentions. A Move is modified by a grammatical operator π or a lexical modifier $\sum$. Moves are made up of one or more Discourse Acts (A). Each Discourse Act is characterized on the basis of its Illocution, represented by means of an illocutionary frame (abstract one ILL or performative ♦) in which variables are introduced for the Speaker $(P_1)_S$ and the Addressee $(P_2)_A$. The third argument of the illocutionary frame is the Communicated Content (C), constructed on the basis of Referential (R)

and Ascriptive (T) Subacts. Garcia Velasco and Rijkhoff (2008: 10) argue that these variable, which were absent in FG, make it possible to distinguish between semantic entities and the pragmatic functions of reference and predication or ascription.




Figure 1: General Layout of FDG (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008 : 14)

Basic and Converted Illocutions in Functional Grammar

Dik (1997a: 301) (1997b: 231) differentiates three types of illocution: that which is intended by the speaker (Ill_S), that which is encoded in the clausal expression (Ill_E), and that which is interpreted by the addressee (Ill_A). Where fully successful communication is achieved, Ill_A is identical to Ill_S, but in cases where Ill_E does not encode Ill_S very explicitly, there are, as Dik points out, many instances where the interpreted illocution differs from that intended by the speaker. For instance, an utterance intended simply as a statement might be interpreted by the addressee as a warning. Dik (1997b: 232) makes it clear that it is the illocution as coded in the expression which is of central interest in FG;

> From the point of view of grammar we are primarily interested in Ill_E: the illocution to the extent that it is coded in linguistic expression. Ill_E will not on one hand have some kind of reflection in the formal (including the prosodic) structure of linguistic expression (if not, it could not be said to be coded in that expression); on the other hand, it is an integrated part of the semantic structure of the expression. For these two reasons, Ill_E is a property of linguistic expressions that a grammar will have to account for.

Dik (1997a) proposes an illocutionary variable, E, at the final level in his account of the underlying structure of the clause which he calls Level 4 or 'from proposition to clause'. At this level the proposition is converted into a full clause representing a speech act. Butler (2003: 1) explains that Dik's illocutionary variable is introduced to account for cases such as that in the following example where *that* refers anaphorically to the speech act the previous speaker has just produced.

(1) a. *if we do it alternative days you're going to finish up not really having done anything special*.
b. *(laughs) no but [a] (laughs)* ***that****'s not fair*.

Dik (1997a: 300 – 301) comments that many attempts to set up speech act typologies have paid insufficient attention to grammatical coding, and have approached illocution mainly from the view point of the speaker, rather than as an aspect of a communicative relationship between speaker and addressee. He also takes issue with the tendency to regard the final interpretation of the utterance as the basis for the assignment of its primary illocutionary force.

Dik (1997b: 232 – 36) rejects, for a number of reasons, the type of analysis which postulates, for all clauses with illocutionary force, an underlying structure containing a performative verb. Explicit performative clauses are very rare in authentic interaction; furthermore, when they are used, they are clearly marked versions of the corresponding 'implicit performatives' (i.e. clauses which use grammatical devices to indicate illocution), often employed as emphatic repetitions: it therefore seems unwise to postulate performatives as the basic structure. According to Dik (Ibid), the performative analysis runs into many problems. Moreover, FG does not permit the kind of deletion which is needed in order to get from the underlying performative structure to the structure of the actual utterance.

In view of the concentration on Ill_E, Dik (Ibid) approaches the description of

illocution by asking what speech act values are universally encoded in the grammars of languages. He recognizes several basic sentence types stating that "In all languages we find special sentence types classifiable as Declaratives, Interrogatives, and Imperatives, and in most languages we find a special sentence type for Exclamatives" (1997a: 301)

Each of the four basic illocutions, as coded in sentence type, can be interpreted in terms of the ways in which the speaker wishes to change the pragmatic information of the addressee (Ibid: 301 – 302). The glosses given for each sentence type are as follows:

Declarative: S wishes A to add the content of the linguistic expression to his pragmatic information.

Interrogative: S wishes A to provide him with the verbal information as requested in the linguistic expression.

Imperative: S wishes A to perform the content as specified in the linguistic expression.

Exclamative: S wishes A to know that the content of the linguistic expression impresses S as surprising, unexpected, or otherwise worthy of notice. (Dik 1997b: 239).

Dik (Ibid) assumes that the basic illocution of an expression can be converted to other values. In *The Theory of Functional Grammar Part 1* Dik (1997a: 302) proposes three different types of conversion: pragmatic, lexical, and grammatical. By pragmatic conversion is meant the construction, by the addressee, of an interpretation which is not coded in the expression, but must be inferred from the aspects of the co-text and/or context. For instance, the expression 'His leg broke in two places' could be used, in conversation, as a warning to the addressee when operating in circumstances similar to those which cause the person's leg to break; or it could even be used as a threat that the speaker will break the addressee's legs just as s/he did with the other person. However, Dik considers such interpretations as beyond the concerns of grammar, for "this type of conversion will not be handled in the linguistic description, but in a wider, pragmatic theory of verbal interaction" (Ibid).

Lexical conversion is concerned with the use of a performative verb to make the illocution more explicit, as in the example below:

(2) I tell you I did not go.

However, in *The Theory of Functional Grammar Part 2*, Dik no longer makes use of the concept of lexical conversion. His interpretation (1997b: 252 – 54) of examples of the type shown in (2) is that since the content of the embedded clause is enough in itself to add the required pragmatic information to the addressee's store, the additional pragmatic information that the speaker is telling the addressee the assertion acts as a reinforcement of that assertion.

Grammatical conversion refers to the situation in which a language has conventionalized devices for converting a basic illocution into a derived one. Such conversions are, thus, within the scope of the grammar itself. Dik (Ibid: 249 – 50) concedes, however, that it is sometimes difficult to draw a borderline between grammatical and pragmatic conversions. As far as English language is concerned, he (Ibid : 243) gives examples of the grammatical conversions of Declarative to

Interrogative, and Imperative to Request by means of tag, Declarative to Request and Interrogative to Request by means of *please*, Interrogative to Rhetorical question, Interrogative to Exclamative, and Imperative to Exclamative by means of intonation. Here are some examples:

(3) You aren't bored, are you, Liz? (Decl >Int)

(4) Can you just put the Pepsi somewhere for me, please? (Int > Req)

(5) Please ring soon. (Imp > Req)

(6) Stop worrying, will you? (Imp > Req)

(7) Who would want immortality? (Int > Rhet)

(8) You want our money? (Decl > Int)

Pragmatic Adequacy in FDG: Illocutionary Force and Illocutionary Force Indicating Device

According to Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008), the Interpersonal Level is the pragmatic level, while the general layout of the theory shows that the Interpersonal Level is part of the Grammatical Component, and that the Conceptual and Contextual Components are outside the operation.

Hengeveld's model of illocution differs from Dik's in that it handles illocutionary force in terms of an illocutionary frame rather than an operator. This frame is of the general form shown below, where F represents illocutionary force, ILL an abstract illocutionary predicate, ♦ represents an illocutionary variable, together with a modifier ∑ and an operator π.

$$(\pi\ F_1: \blacklozenge/ILL\ (F_1): \sum (F_1))$$

In order to distinguish the illocutionary force, functional Grammar has to accommodate means for indicating a given force to the addressee, or the addressee would not be able to decode the message, that is, the meaning of the speaker's utterance (his communicative intention). Here, the interpersonal part of Functional Grammar comes into play, for the speaker has to follow some constitutive semantic rules for the 'illocutionary force indicating devices', i.e. the verbal signs for literally encoding the force intention of the conceptual component. In FDG, this is dealt with at the Interpersonal, or pragmatic, Level of representation.

According to Bakker and Siewierska (2004: 350 – 51), the Interpersonal Level does not seem to be pragmatic. It is the Conceptual Component that deals with the pragmatic meaning since it concerns the meaning of the speaker's utterance, whereas the Interpersonal Level would be part of semantics dealing with word and sentence meaning. Bakker and Siewierska (Ibid) consider it no more than a sub – level, lumped together with the Representational Level into a semantic level. The illocutionary force in FDG cannot be an illocutionary force in the meaning of Dik, Moutaouakil, or those who hold the modular approaches. This is due to the fact that they consider this concept as an integrated part of the pre – grammatical (Conceptual) component, whereas FDG interprets it as a part of the Grammatical Component.

Illocution in FDG

Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008: 68) hold that the Illocution of a Discourse Act captures the lexical and formal properties of the Discourse Act which can be attributed to its conventionalized interpersonal use in achieving a communicative intention. According to FDG, communicative intentions include

such Discourse Act types as calling for attention, asserting, ordering, questioning, warning, requesting, etc., which may map onto Illocutions such Vocative, Declarative, Imperative, etc. Dik (1997a: 425) states that there is no one-to-one relation between a specific communicative intention and an Illocution, as languages may differ significantly in the extent to which they make use of linguistic means to differentiate between communicative intentions. Since every Discourse Act contains an Illocution, FDG considers the presence of illocutionary indicators an important diagnostic factor for the Discourse Act status of a linguistic unit.

The general frame for Illocutions has the following structure:

$(\pi\ F_1:\ \blacklozenge/\text{ILL}\ (F_1):\ \sum\ (F_1))$ (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 71)

According to FDG, performatives are lexical expressions of the illocutionary force. This is represented in the frames (a) and (b):

(a) $(\pi\ A_1: [\pi F_1:\blacklozenge\ (F_1))\ (P_1)_S\ (P_2)_A\ (C_1)]\ (A_1))\Phi$

(b) $(\pi\ A_1: [\pi F_1:\text{ILL}\ (F_1))\ (P_1)_S\ (P_2)_A\ (C_1)]\ (A_1))\Phi$ (Ibid)

Consider the illocutionary force of B's utterance in the following example:

(9) A. I don't feel well these days.

B. Why don't you give up smoking?

In Searle and Dik's terms, B's sentence has a *secondary illocutionary force*; that is of a question, and a *primary* one that is derived from the secondary one through the use of context and concept; in this case it is of 'advice'. By applying Dik's rules (1997 a: 302), in order for Ill_E to encode Ill_S explicitly, and in order that Ill_A be fully identical with Ills there must be a context and a concept.

According to Moutaouakil (1986, 1991), the utterance in (9 B) has an implicated illocution derived from its literal illocution by the process of conventionalization. After this process is applied, the sentence will have the illocutionary force of 'advice'.

According to FDG, this sentence is analyzed as follows:

$(\pi\ A_1: [\pi F_1:\ \text{INTER}_{\text{Neg}}\ (F_1))\ (P_2)_A:$ you $(P_2))_A\ (C_1:$- give up smoking $(C_1))]\ (A_1))$

FDG analyzes it as a negative question having the illocutionary force of Interrogative.

According to the illocutionary rules of FDG, for this sentence to have the illocutionary force of 'advice', it must be said as follows:

B. I advise you to give up smoking.

Consider now the difference between (A) and (B) in the following example analyzed according to FDG:

(10) A. I promise (you) to do the washing-up.

B. I will do the washing-up.

A-1. $(\pi\ A_1: [\pi F_1:\text{promise}_V\ (F_1))\ (P_1:$ I $(P_1))_S\ (P_2:$ (you) $(P_2))_A\ (C_1:$ do the washing-up $(C_1))]\ (A_1))$

B-1. $(\pi\ A_1: [\pi F_1:\ \text{DECL}\ (F_1))\ (P_1:$ I $(P_1))_S\ (P_2)_A\ (C_1:$ do the washing-up $(C_1))]\ (A_1))$

According to FDG, (10 B) is a declarative 'indicative' clause, as indicated by the implicit performative DECL. Thus, (10 A) and (10 B) are interpersonally different, owing to the lexico-grammatical structure. In (10 B) the speaker gives the addressee a piece of information ;("I'll do the washing-up in an unspecified future"), not committing himself as in (10 A). Pragmatically, on the level of communicative intention, both (10 A) and

(10 B) would be presumably promises, but in different ways.

According to FDG (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 71) both explicit (♦) and implicit (ILL) performatives can be modified by a manner satellite:

(11) A. Sincerely, this is not a trick.

B. I promise (you) sincerely that this is not a trick.

(Ibid: 72)

A-1. $(\pi\ A_I: [(F_I: DECL\ (F_I){:}sincerely_{Adv}\ (F_I))\ (P_I)_S\ (P_J)_A\ (C_I)]\ (A_I))$

B-1. $(\pi\ A_I: [(F_I: promise_v(F_I){:}sincerely_{Adv}\ (F_I))\ (P_I)_S\ (P_J)_A\ (C_I)]\ (A_I))$

The difference between a performative and a non-performative can be shown as follows:

(12) A. Peter insisted that Sheila is ill.

B. That's not true. (She isn't)

C. That's not true. (He didn't)

(13) A. I insist that Sheila is ill.

B. That's not true. (She isn't)

C.*That's not true. (*You don't).

In the past tense, as in (12 A), *Peter insisted that Sheila is ill*, negation may be of the validity of the embedded propositional content of Sheila's being ill (12 B), or of the embedded act of insisting that this is so (12 C). In explicit performatives, the interpersonal illocution (♦) cannot be denied (12 C). This is taken by FDG to mean that the performative verb in (13 A), *insist*, belongs to the Interpersonal Level.

Another fact, mentioned in FDG, is that the Speech Participants are explicit with explicit performatives. This is not so with implicit performatives (Ibid: 70).

(14) I promise you, guys, that I'll come back.

$(A_I :[(F_I: promise_v\ (F_I))\ (1P_I)_S\ (mP_J)_A\ (C_I:$ - I'll come back – $(C_I))\Phi]\ (A_I))\Phi$

According to FDG, explicit performatives may be modified by the performative adverbial Satellite of Instrument, *hereby*, *herewith*. Consider the following example.

(15) I hereby state that I wish to resign.

$(\pi A_I: [(F_I: state_v\ (F_I))\ (P_I)_S\ (P_J)_A\ (C_I)_{Nuc}\ (C_J[(R_I{:}[proxA_I]\ (R_I)]\ (C_J))_{Instr}]\ (A_I))$

The above example has the statement force, indicated by the lexical predicate *state*. The formula has also two hierarchically ordered communicated contents, C_I and C_J; C_I is the nuclear part, C_J the instrumental satellite *hereby*.

Indirect Illocutions in FDG

According to the evidence at hand, FDG in its current form is unable to account for the implicit or indirect illocutions due to the segregation of the Conceptual and Contextual Components from the Grammatical Component. Different theories give different accounts for the conventionalized illocution and for the primary and secondary illocutions. However, despite the fact that FDG comprises Conceptual and Contextual Components, still the frames of the Interpersonal Level and especially the illocutionary frames are completely empty of these components. For FDG to be pragmatically adequate, the Conceptual and Contextual Components need to be integrated in the grammatical component, and there must be a slot for these components in the illocutionary frame. The illocutionary frame that the study suggests is as follows:

$(\pi\ A_1: [\pi F_1{:}ILL: [(\ Concep{:}\text{-}\ (Ill_E)_{Sec}\ (Ill_A)_{Prim}\ (Concep))]\ [(Contx{:}\text{-}\ (Ill_A)_{Convn}\ (Contx))](F_1))\ (P_1)_S\ (P_2)_A\ (C_1)]\ (A_1))\Phi$

In this frame (Concep) stands for Conceptual Component, (Sec) for

secondary illocution, (Prim) for the primary one, (Contx) for Contextual Component, and (Convn) stands for conventionalized illocution.

Consider the analysis of B's utterance in example (9) above:

B. Why don't you give up smoking?

(π A_1: [πF_1: ILL:[(Concep:- $(INTER_{NEG})_{Sec}$ $(ADVICE)_{Prim}$ (Concep))] (F_1)) $(P_1)_S$ (P_2: you $(P_2))_A$ (C_1:- give up smoking – (C_1)] (A_1))

Consider now example (16), being analyzed in two ways. The first one (a) is according to the current illocutionary frame used in FDG, and the second (b) is according to the suggested illocutionary frame:

(16) Can you pass the jam? (said at breakfast table)

(a) (π A_1: [πF_1: INTER (F_1)) $(P_1)_S$ (P_2: you $(P_2))_A$ (C_1:- pass the jam – (C_1))] (A_1))

(b) (π A_1: [πF_1:ILL: [(Concep: (Ill_E: INTER $(Ill_E))_{Sec}$ (Concep))] [(Contx: (Ill_A: REQUEST $(Ill_A))_{Convn}$ (Contx))] (F_1)) $(P_1)_S$ (P_2: you $(P))_A$ (C_1: pass the jam (C_1))] (A_1))

This proves that FDG is in need of integrating the Conceptual and Contextual Components with the Grammatical Component in order to be pragmatically adequate. In this way the Grammatical Component will consist of five levels; the first level is the Pragmatic Level, which in turn consists of two layers: the Conceptual Layer and the Contextual Layer. This will be in accordance with Dik's and Moutaouakil's views about the grammatically conventionalized illocutions. The second is the Interpersonal Level where the Ideas formed at the Pragmatic Level are decoded. The other three levels (the Representational, Morphosyntactic, and Phonological) are to remain as they are.

According to the new frame, the proposed layout of FDG will be as follows in Figure 2:




Figure 2: The Proposed Layout of FDG

5.3.3.1. Examples

Indirect illocutions undergo different kinds of conversion according to the different kinds of context they are said in. The most well-known in most cultures and societies among these is the social-cultural-conventional conversion since it is nearly the same in most societies. Examples (17 –23) are indirect illocutions in English that are converted conventionally or socio-culturally taken from Quirk et al. (1985: 805 – 832). Examples (26 – 30) are indirect ones in Arabic that are also converted in the same

way taken from the Holy Quran. Each of them is analyzed twice: the first one (A) is according to the current illocutionary frame that is presented by Hengeveld and Mackenzie's Functional Discourse Grammar (2008, 2006), and the second (B) is according to the suggested illocutionary frame:

(17) I think you'd better leave at once. [Declarative > warning]

(A) (π A_1: [(F_1: DECL (F_1)) (P_1: I $(P_1))_S$ (P_2: you $(P_2))_A$ (C_1: leave at once (C_1))] (A_1))

(B) (π A_1: [(F_1: ILL: [(Concep: (Ill_E: DECL-$(Ill_E))_{Sec}$ (Ill_A: WARNING$(Ill_A))_{Prim}$ (Concep))] (F_1)) (P_1: I $(P_1))_S$ (P_2: you $(P_2))_A$ (C_1: leave at once (C_1))] (A_1))

(18) Do you happen to have a pencil? (Interrogative > Request)

(A) (π A_1: [(F_1: INTER (F_1)) $(P_1)_S$ (P_2: you $(P_2))_A$ (C_1: have a pencil (C_1))] (A_1))

(B) (π A_1: [(F_1:ILL: [(Concep: (Ill_E: INTER- $(Ill_E))_{Seco}$ (Concep))] [(Contx:- (Ill_A: REQUEST $(Ill_A))_{Convn}$ (Contx))](F_1)) $(P_1)_S$ (P_2: you $(P_2))_A$ (C_1: have a pencil (C_1))] (A_1))

(19) I'd like to know the name of your last employer.

(Declarative> Inquiry)

(A) (π A_1: [(F_1:DECL (F_1)) (P_1: I $(P_1))_S$ $(P_2)_A$ (C_1: I know the name of your last employer (C_1))] (A_1))

(B) (π A_1: [(F_1:ILL: [(Concep: (Ill_E: DECL $(Ill_E))_{Seco}$ (Concep))] [(Contx:- (Ill_A: INQUIRY-$(Ill_A))_{Convn}$ (Contx))](F_1)) (P_1:I $(P_1))_S$ (P_2 $)_A$ (C_1: I know the name of your last employer (C_1))] (A_1))

(20) Do you want another cup (of tea)? (Interrogative > Offer)

(A) (π A_1: [(F_1:INTER (F_1)) $(P_1)_S$ (P_2: you $(P_2))_A$ (C_1: you want another cup of tea(C_1))] (A_1))

(B) (π A_1: [(F_1:ILL: [(Concep: (Ill_E: INTER $(Ill_E))_{Sec}$ (Concep))] [(Contx: (Ill_A: OFFER- $Ill_A))_{Convn}$ (Contx))](F_1)) $(P_1)_S$ (P_2: you$(P_2))_A$ (C_1: you want another cup of tea (C_1))] (A_1))

(21) Remember that I am always ready to help. (Imperative > Offer)

(A) (π A_1: [(F_1:IMPER (F_1)) (P_1:I $(P_1))_S$ $(P_2)_A$ (C_1: I am ready to help (C_1))] (A_1))

(B) (π A_1: [(F_1:ILL: [(Concep: (Ill_E: IMPER $(Ill_E))_{Seco}$ $(Ill_A)_{Prim}$ (Concep))] [(Contx: (Ill_A: OFFER $(Ill_A))_{Convn}$ (Contx))](F_1)) (P_1: I $(P_1))_S$ $(P_2)_A$ (C_1: I am ready to help (C_1))] (A_1)

(22) I'd sell your car if I were you. (Declarative > Advice)

(A) (π A_1: [(F_1:DECL (F_1)) (P_1: I $(P_1))_S$ (P_2: you $(P_2))_A$ (C_1: I sell your car (C_1))] (A_1))

(B) (π A_1: [(F_1:ILL: [(Concep: (Ill_E: DECL $(Ill_E))_{Sec}$ (Ill_A: ADVICE $(Ill_A))_{Prim}$ (Concep))] [(Contx: $(Ill_A)_{Convn}$ (Contx))](F_1)) (P_1:I $(P_1))_S$ (P_2: you $(P_2))_A$ (C_1: sell your car (C_1))] (A_1))

(23) Open the door, please. (Imperative > request)

(A) (π A_1: [πF_1: IMPER (F_1)) $(P_1)_S$ $(P_2)_A$ (C_1: open the door (C_1))] (A_1))

(B) (π A_1: [(F_1:ILL: [(Concep: (Ill_E: IMPER (Ill_E))$_{Sec}$ (Ill_A)$_{Prim}$ (Concep))] [(Contx: (Ill_A: REQUEST (Ill_A))$_{Convn}$ (Contx))](F_1)) (P_1)$_S$ (P_2)$_A$ (C_1: open the door (C_1))] (A_1))

(24) You are staying HERE? (Declarative> interrogative)

(A) (π(A_1:[πF_1: DECL (F_1)) (P_1)$_S$ (P_2:you (P_2))$_A$ (C_1: you are staying here (C_1))] (A_1))

(B) (πA_1: [F_1: ILL: [(Concep: Ill_E: DECL (Ill_E))$_{Sec}$ (Concep))][(Contx: (Ill_A: INTER (Ill_A))$_{Conv}$ (Contx))] (F_1)) (P_1)$_S$ (P_2): you (P_2))$_A$ (C_1: you are staying here (C_1))] (A_1))

(25) Who would forget such a nice party? (Interrogative> Rhetoric)

(A) (πA_1: [F_1:INTER (F_1)) (P_1)$_S$ (P_2)$_A$ (C_1:who would forget such a nice party (C_1))](A_1))

(B) (πA_1: [F_1: ILL: [Concep: Ill_E: INTER (Ill_E))$_{Sec}$ (Concep))] [(Contx: (Ill_A: DECL (Ill_A))$_{Conv}$ (Contx))] (F_1)) (P_1))$_S$ (P_2)$_A$ (C_1: no one would forget such a nice party (C_1))] (A_1))

From Arabic *The Holy Quran* gives the following questions to express different illocutions (Translation is taken from Ali : 1989):

(26) /hel ata: ələl insani hi:num` minəd`dəhriləm jəkun ʃei `əm`məðku:ra/

QUEST. come.PAST. over human. SG. A long period of time. 3.SG be.PAST NEG. thing.

﴿ هَلۡ أَتَىٰ عَلَى ٱلۡإِنسَٰنِ حِينٞ مِّنَ ٱلدَّهۡرِ لَمۡ يَكُن شَيۡـٔٗا مَّذۡكُورًا ١ ﴾ الإنسان: ١

Has there been over man a long period of time, when he was nothing.(76/1)

(Interrogative > Declarative)

(A) (πA_1: [(F_1:INTER (F_1)) (P_1)$_S$ (P_2)$_A$ (C_1:there has been over man a long period of time when he was nothing (C_1))] (A_1))

(B) (π A_1: [(F_1: ILL :[(Concep:-(Ill_E:- INTER (Ill_E))$_{Seco}$ (Concep))][Contx:- Ill_A:- DECL (Ill_A)) $_{Prim}$ (Contx)) (F_1))] (P_1)$_S$ (P_2)$_A$ (C_1:- there has been over man a long period of time when he was nothing- (C_1))] (A_1))

(27) /hel jəstəwil` leði:nə je `ələmu:nə wəl`leði:nə la: je`ələmu:nə/

QUEST.be PRES. (m) 3. (m) equal know.PRES. and 3.(m) know.PRES. NEG

﴿ هَلۡ يَسۡتَوِي ٱلَّذِينَ يَعۡلَمُونَ وَٱلَّذِينَ لَا يَعۡلَمُونَۗ ٩ ﴾ الزمر: ٩

Are those equal, those who know and those who don't know. (39/9)

(Interrogative> Negative)

(A)(πA_1: [(F_1:INTER (F_1))(P_1)$_S$ (P_2)$_A$ (C_1: they are equal, those who know and those who don't know (C_1))](A_1))

(B)(πA_1:[(F_1:ILL:[(Concep:-(Ill_E: INTER (Ill_E)) $_{Seco}$ (Concep))] [(Contx:-(Ill_A: NEG (Ill_A))$_{Convn}$(Contx))] (F_1))] (P_1)$_S$ (P_2)$_A$ (C_1: they are equal, those who know and those who don't know (C_1))](A_1))

(28) /həl d3eza:` ul ihsa:ni iləl ihsa:n/

QUEST.reward- good- except- good

﴿ هَلۡ جَزَآءُ ٱلۡإِحۡسَٰنِ إِلَّا ٱلۡإِحۡسَٰنُ ٦٠ ﴾ الرحمن: ٦٠

Is there any reward for good other than good. (55/60)

Interrogative>Negative

(A)(π A_1:[(F_1:INTER (F_1)) (P_1)$_s$(P_2)$_A$ (C_1: other than good is reward for good(C_1))](A_1))

(B)(π A_1:[(F_1:ILL: [(Concep: (Ill_E:- INTER (Ill_E)) (Concep))$_{Seco}$]

[(Contx: (Ill$_A$:- NEG- (Ill$_A$)) $_{Convn}$ $_{Prim}$(Contx))] (P$_1$)$_S$ (P$_2$)$_A$(C$_1$: other than good is reward for good (C$_1$))](A$_1$))

(29) /ma: tilkə bijəmi:nikə ja: mu:sa:/
QUEST.this. in. your. right. hand. VOC.musa

﴿ وَمَا تِلْكَ بِيَمِينِكَ يَٰمُوسَىٰ ﴿١٧﴾ ﴾ طه: ١٧

What is that in thy right hand, O Moses. (20/17)

Interrogative> Directive

(A) (πA$_1$:[(F$_1$:INTER (F$_1$))(P$_1$)$_S$ (P$_2$: Moses$_{VOC}$ (P$_2$))$_A$ (C$_1$: this in your right hand (C$_1$))] (A$_1$))

(B)(πA$_1$:[(F$_1$: ILL: [(Concep: (Ill$_E$: INTER (Ill$_E$)) (Concep)) $_{Seco}$][(Contx: (Ill$_A$: DIREC: look at (Ill$_A$))$_{Convn}$ $_{Prim}$ (Contx))](F$_1$))(P$_1$)$_S$ (P$_2$: Moses$_{VOC}$ (P$_2$))$_A$ (C$_1$: this in thy right hand (C$_1$))] (A$_1$))

Among other socio-cultural conversions in Arabic, the *Holy Quran* uses the following likelihood to express certainty:

(30) /kad nara tak ka'lubə wad3hikə fis' səma'/
1m-may- see- 2SG POSSESSIVE- face- in Heaven

﴿ قَدْ نَرَىٰ تَقَلُّبَ وَجْهِكَ فِي السَّمَاءِ ﴿١٤٤﴾ ﴾ البقرة: ١٤٤

We may see the turning of thy face in heaven. (2/ 144)

(A) (πA$_1$:[F$_1$:likelihood (F$_1$)) (P$_1$: we (P$_1$))$_S$ (P$_2$: you (P$_2$))$_A$(C$_1$:we see the turning of thy face in heaven (C$_1$))] (A$_1$))

(B) (πA$_1$:[(F$_1$: ILL:[(Concep: (Ill$_E$: Likelihhod (Ill$_E$)) (Concep))$_{Seco}$][(Contx: (Ill$_A$: Certainty (Ill$_A$))$_{Convn}$ $_{Prim}$ (Contx))](F$_1$)) (P$_1$: we (P$_1$))$_S$ (P$_2$: you (P$_2$))$_A$(C$_1$:we see the turning of thy face in heaven (C$_1$))] (A$_1$))

Conclusions

The study shows that the new theory fails in accounting for the indirect or implicit illocution. This failure is due to the segregation of the Conceptual and Contextual Components from the Grammatical Component. The illocutionary frame presented by Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008) falls short in expressing indirect illocution. This is revealed by the fact that the model presents two frames, one for the lexical variable of illocution, and the other for what Hengeveld and Mackenzie call the abstract one.

The Conceptual and Contextual Components are to be integrated in the grammatical component in a way that they together make a pragmatic level. This leads to the suggestion of a new illocutionary frame which has slots for both the Conceptual and Contextual Components. The suggested frame will enable FDG to account for both types of illocution: the abstract (indirect) ones and those with explicit performatives, which will result in a more pragmatically adequate model.

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« المعنى التداوُلي في نحو الخطاب الوظيفي »

<u>خلاصة :</u>

لنحو الخطاب الوظيفي أسلوبه الخاص في التعامل مع المعنى القصدي للكلام. ذلك أنه يقسمه على مجرد وآخر متعلق بالأفعال الأدائية. تلقي هذه الدراسة الضوء على الأسلوب الذي يتناول به نحوُ الخطاب الوظيفي المعنى القصديَّ وفقاً لإطاره الموجود حالياً مبينةً عدم قدرته على التعبير عن المعنى القصدي الضمني. تقترح الدراسة نظرة جديدة تستند إلى ما يحيط بالكلام من مضمون سياقي ومفاهيمي . و تقترح الدراسة ـ أيضاً ـ إطاراً جديداً للنظرية وتُحلِّل بعض الأمثلة وفقاً للإطار المقترح لبيان مدى قابلية تطبيقه .